The US Has Used 'Virtually All' of Its Long-Range Precision Munitions – Good Machine

TL;DR

The US Army has used "virtually all" of its ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) stockpiles during the five-month Iran war, two sources told Reuters on 4 August 2026.
The US has also consumed a little less than half of its global Tomahawk cruise missile supply.
These munitions are precisely the weapons that would be critical in any conflict with China — which has the world's most advanced integrated air defence systems.
Production is at record levels but cannot replace expended stocks quickly. The industrial base was not sized for a sustained precision-strike campaign.
The depletion has not been previously reported. The White House response — "far more munitions than anyone in the world" — does not address the specific stockpile data.

What Happened

Reuters broke the story on 4 August 2026, citing two sources familiar with US military stockpile data: the US Army has used "virtually all" of its supply of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and the newer Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) during the five-month war with Iran (Reuters, 4 Aug 2026).

A third source told Reuters that the US has also used a little less than half of its global supply of Tomahawk cruise missiles since the war began on 28 February 2026. The extent of the depletion had not been previously reported.

The long-range precision munitions have been used to strike targets inside Iran, according to a March 2026 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). PrSM stockpiles were low to begin with — the missile is relatively new and had not yet been produced at scale before the conflict began.

A fourth person familiar with the matter said US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees US forces in the Middle East, had nearly used up the land-based missiles it held before the war but had been able to replenish supplies from US military stocks elsewhere in the world (Reuters, 4 Aug 2026).

The White House issued a statement from President Donald Trump in response to Reuters' questions about the stockpile data: "We have far more munitions than anyone in the world" and "far more than we need." Trump added: "Our defence companies are, at this moment, making more munitions than they have ever made before, in addition to expanding their plants and equipment at record levels" (Reuters, 4 Aug 2026).

Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of both ATACMS and PrSM, did not immediately respond to requests for comment (Daily Mail, 4 Aug 2026).

What It Actually Means

The Arithmetic Does Not Work

The core problem is not that the US is running out of bombs. It is that the US is running out of the specific category of weapons that would be most critical in a conflict with a near-peer adversary — and those weapons cannot be replaced quickly.

ATACMS and PrSM are surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 km and 500+ km respectively. They are designed to strike high-value targets — air defence systems, command and control nodes, missile launchers — from standoff range. Each costs over $1 million per round (Economic Times, 4 Aug 2026).

In a conflict with China, these are precisely the weapons that would be needed to degrade China's integrated air defence systems before US aircraft could operate safely. Without them, the opening phase of any Pacific conflict would be far more costly in pilots and aircraft.

The Tomahawk depletion is a separate but related problem. Tomahawks are ship- and submarine-launched cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 1,500 km. They serve a similar standoff strike role but from naval platforms. Using nearly half the global stockpile in five months against Iran — a country with degraded but still functional air defences — suggests a burn rate that is unsustainable against a peer adversary.

The Industrial Base Was Not Built for This

The US defence industrial base was optimised for the post-Cold War era: short, high-intensity campaigns against adversaries with limited air defences (Iraq 1991, Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011). Precision munitions were used sparingly because air superiority was quickly established and aircraft could operate with relative freedom.

Iran is different. Iran's air defence network — supplemented by systems from China and Russia — has not been fully suppressed despite five months of operations (Middle East Eye, 4 Aug 2026). This has forced the US to rely on standoff precision weapons rather than direct attack aircraft, burning through munitions at a rate the industrial base cannot match.

Production is increasing. Lockheed Martin has expanded PrSM production lines. Raytheon (RTX) has reached a tentative multi-year agreement with the Pentagon to increase Tomahawk production (Economic Times, 4 Aug 2026). But ramping precision munitions manufacturing takes years, not months. The specialised components — guidance systems, rocket motors, warheads — have long lead times and limited supplier bases.

The China Contingency Gap

This is the story beneath the story. Every ATACMS and PrSM fired at Iran is a round that is not available for a potential conflict in the Pacific. The US military's planning scenarios for a China conflict assume large stockpiles of precision standoff weapons to degrade Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems in the opening days of a conflict.

Analysts have warned for years that US munitions stockpiles were inadequate for a sustained peer conflict. The CSIS wargame series on a China-Taiwan scenario consistently found that the US would exhaust key precision munitions within the first week of conflict. The Iran war has now validated those warnings in real combat conditions — and the peer conflict has not even started.

The US has also pulled air defence systems and troops from East Asia to support the Iran campaign (Middle East Eye, 4 Aug 2026). The double drain — munitions and deployed forces — represents a strategic exposure that China's military planners are undoubtedly tracking.

Hype Deconstruction

This is not "the US is out of bombs." The US retains enormous stocks of other munitions — Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), artillery shells, air-to-air missiles, and shorter-range precision weapons. The depletion is specific to long-range surface-to-surface precision missiles.

This is not a sudden development. The burn rate has been high since February. What is new is the disclosure of the specific depletion level — "virtually all" — which had not been previously reported.

The White House response is not a denial. "We have far more munitions than anyone in the world" is a statement about total inventory, not about the specific category of weapons in question. It does not contradict the Reuters reporting.

Production is increasing but cannot close the gap quickly. The Pentagon has placed large orders. Lockheed and Raytheon are expanding production lines. But the lead times for precision munitions are measured in years, and the burn rate in Iran is measured in months.

Stakeholder Landscape

US Central Command (CENTCOM): The immediate consumer. CENTCOM has been managing the munitions shortage by drawing from global stockpiles, but that is a finite fix. The command's ability to sustain operations at the current tempo is now in question.

US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM): The strategic loser. Every round fired in the Middle East is a round not available for a Pacific contingency. INDOPACOM's planning assumptions are being eroded in real time.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA): The strategic beneficiary. The PLA is watching the US burn through precisely the weapons that would be used against Chinese A2/AD systems. The depletion provides China with a window of reduced US readiness that could last years.

Lockheed Martin (LMT): The manufacturer of ATACMS and PrSM. Lockheed benefits from replenishment orders but faces production capacity constraints. The company received a record $58.6 billion contract for Patriot missile interceptors in July 2026 (Wikipedia, 4 Aug 2026), which competes for the same manufacturing resources.

Raytheon / RTX: The manufacturer of Tomahawk. The tentative multi-year production agreement with the Pentagon signals that the government recognises the depletion problem and is moving to address it — but the timeline is long.

Iran: The intended target. Iran's ability to sustain the conflict despite the precision bombardment is itself a strategic signal. The regime has absorbed five months of strikes and continues to function, in part because it has received replacement air defence systems from China and Russia.

US allies in the Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Philippines): The indirect stakeholders with the most to lose. US extended deterrence guarantees depend on the credibility of US military power. If the Iran war has materially degraded that power, the deterrence calculus in the Pacific shifts.

Cross-Layer Implications

Defence industrial policy: The depletion exposes a structural mismatch between the US military's warfighting doctrine (precision standoff strikes as the opening phase of any conflict) and its industrial base (optimised for short campaigns against limited adversaries). Fixing this requires not just more money but a fundamental reorganisation of defence manufacturing — more suppliers, shorter lead times, surge capacity.

Alliance management: US allies in Europe and the Pacific are watching. The UK, France, and other NATO members have their own precision munitions stockpiles, also depleted by support for Ukraine. The collective Western precision-strike capacity is at a generational low.

Deterrence theory: The Iran war is a live test of a proposition that has been debated in defence circles for decades: can precision standoff weapons substitute for mass in a sustained campaign? The answer, so far, appears to be no — at least not at current production rates.

Energy markets: The munitions depletion is directly connected to the Strait of Hormuz situation. The US Navy's ability to keep the Strait open depends in part on its ability to strike Iranian anti-ship missile batteries from standoff range. If Tomahawk stocks continue to decline, the Navy's options narrow.

Domestic politics: The depletion data has not yet fully entered the US political debate. When it does, it will sharpen the already-contentious question of whether the Iran war is worth its strategic cost. The "virtually all" framing is politically potent.

Recommendations

For defence analysts and policymakers: The key number to track is not the current stockpile level but the production rate versus the burn rate. If the US is expending ATACMS/PrSM faster than Lockheed can produce them — which appears to be the case — the stockpile will not recover until the conflict ends or the burn rate drops. The CSIS wargame data on China contingency munitions requirements should be revisited with the Iran burn rate as a new input.

For investors in defence equities: Lockheed Martin (LMT) and RTX (formerly Raytheon) are the direct beneficiaries of replenishment orders. But the production constraints mean revenue recognition will be spread over years, not quarters. The more interesting play may be on second-tier precision munitions suppliers who could be brought into the production base as the Pentagon diversifies its supplier network.

For citizens and voters: This is a story about strategic trade-offs that have not been openly debated. The US entered the Iran war in February 2026 with the president predicting a short conflict. Five months later, the military has burned through its most critical precision weapons. The question of whether the war's objectives justify that cost — and the resulting exposure in the Pacific — is a question for democratic accountability, not just military planning.

For allies in the Pacific: The depletion data should inform force posture planning. If US extended deterrence is temporarily degraded, allies may need to fill gaps with their own capabilities — particularly in anti-ship and air defence systems. Australia's AUKUS submarine programme and Japan's counter-strike capability development take on new urgency in this context.

Uncertainty Ledger

Exact stockpile numbers are classified. The Reuters sources declined to specify how many of each munition remain. "Virtually all" could mean dozens or hundreds remaining, depending on the baseline.
Production ramp timelines are uncertain. Lockheed and Raytheon have not disclosed how quickly they can increase output. The Pentagon's multi-year agreements suggest a recognition that the ramp will take years.
Iran's remaining air defence capability is unclear. If Iranian air defences have been sufficiently degraded, the US could shift to direct-attack aircraft operations, reducing the burn rate on standoff weapons. But the fact that the US is still expending precision munitions at this rate suggests air defences remain functional.
China's response is unknown. The PLA is undoubtedly tracking the depletion, but whether it changes Chinese behaviour — in the South China Sea, around Taiwan, or elsewhere — is uncertain.
The June ceasefire (Islamabad memorandum) has not held. Fighting has continued through the summer. A durable ceasefire would stop the burn rate, but the diplomatic path is uncertain.

Bottom Line

The United States has consumed its most strategically critical precision weapons at an unsustainable rate in a five-month war that was supposed to be short. The depletion creates a window of reduced readiness for a China contingency that will take years to close, regardless of how much money is spent. This is the most significant undisclosed fact of the Iran war, and it has implications that extend far beyond the Middle East.

Sources:

Reuters, "US has used 'virtually all' of its long-range precision missiles during Iran war, sources say," 4 August 2026 (Tier 1)
Iran International, "US depleted 'virtually all' long-range precision missiles in Iran war — Reuters," 4 August 2026 (Tier 2)
The Economic Times, "How the Iran war is draining America's long-range missiles crucial in countering potential China, Russia threats," 4 August 2026 (Tier 2)
Middle East Eye, "US depleted 'virtually all' long-range precision missiles during Iran war: Report," 4 August 2026 (Tier 2)
Daily Mail, "US military 'has used virtually all of its long-range precision missiles during Iran war'," 4 August 2026 (Tier 3)
Wikipedia, "2026 Iran war," accessed 4 August 2026 (Tier 3 — contextual)
CSIS, March 2026 report on PrSM stockpiles (referenced by Reuters) (Tier 2)